We study a Lucas asset pricing model that is standard in all respects, except that the representative agent's subjective beliefs about endowment growth are distorted. Using constant-relative-risk-aversion utility, with relative risk aversion coefficient below ten, and fluctuating beliefs that exhibit pessimism over expansions and optimism over contractions, our model is able to match the first and second moments of the equity premium and risk-free rate, as well as the persistence and predictability of excess returns found in the data.
Introduction
Ever since Mehra and Prescott (1985) first articulated the equity premium puzzle, achieving an understanding of aggregate asset price dynamics has occupied a central role in macroeconomic research. In their original statement of the problem, Mehra and Prescott asked whether the rational, complete markets asset pricing model where the representative investor has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility with coefficient below 10 and discount factor between 0 and 1 could account for the approximately 8 percent per annum sample mean return on the Standard and Poors index and the approximately 2 percent per annum sample mean return on relatively risk-free short-term bonds. The resounding failure of that model has come to be known as the equity premium puzzle. Since Mehra and Prescott's original investigation, the list of challenges that aggregate asset pricing theory has taken up has grown substantially. In addition to the mean level of equity and real short-term relatively default free bond returns, this paper seeks to understand their volatility, persistence, long-horizon predictability, and their relationship to the business cycle.
The power of models with common knowledge and fully rational agents to explain these aspects of asset return dynamics has generally been shown to be poor [see Kocherlakota (1996) for a survey of this research]. The approach we take in this paper allows for small departures from rationality in an otherwise standard Lucas (1978) representative-agent asset pricing model of an endowment economy. The agents in our model satisfy the Mehra-Prescott criteria of having CRRA utility with relative risk aversion coefficient below ten and discount factor below one. Agents observe that the actual endowment process shifts stochastically between high and low growth states but their beliefs about the transition probabilities that govern this switching deviate from the true probabilities.
These belief distortions enter along two empirically plausible dimensions. The first is a systematic deviation of the subjective transition probabilities from the objectively 'true' transition probabilities that govern the dynamics of the economy. We motivate distortions of this type by showing how an agent who uses simple rules of thumb to estimate these transition probabilities will form subjective probabilities that deviate from maximum likelihood estimates obtained from U.S. per-capita consumption growth data. These rules of thumb estimates generate beliefs that are relatively pes-simistic about the persistence of the expansion state and relatively optimistic about the persistence of the contraction state and allows our model to match the mean equity premium and risk-free rate found in the data-i.e., the model solves the equity premium puzzle.
This systematic distortion by itself, however, is insufficient to explain the volatility of asset returns or the pattern of serial correlation and predictability exhibited in the data. To go beyond an explanation of the first moments of asset returns, we need to introduce a second distortion in which beliefs about the transition probabilities are randomized about their subjective mean values. This randomization is intended to model the idea that people occasionally mistake pseudo-signals for news which leads to alteration in beliefs and hence swings in asset prices. Black (1986) suggested that the economic environment is complex and noisy, and so individuals may not be able to fully distinguish noise from information. They may misinterpret the guarded statements from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System or the rise in the popularity of a particular political candidate as information and these pseudo-signals become determinants of beliefs. An important point of the paper is that randomization of a particular type is required to match the data-not randomization per se. Specifically, we find it necessary for the subjective transition probabilities themselves to be quite persistent.
The agents in our economy do not learn about the true process over time. With 104 years of data, Bayesian learners would almost surely have learned to be rational by now and because the model performs poorly under rational expectations and CRRA utility, the introduction of optimal learning into the model is unlikely to aid much in understanding asset returns data. If there is learning, it would seem to be very gradual and explicit modelling of slow learning, while interesting in its own right, would produce substantial complexity while contributing only modest insight into the questions at hand.
Our work is part of a growing literature in which local departures from full rationality hold promise in solving empirical puzzles. For example, Cochrane (1989) , demonstrates that adoption of rule-of-thumb behavior instead of pursuing optimal decision rules entails only trivial economic costs even when agents know the objective probability law governing the driving processes. Barsky and Delong (1993) find that long swings in stock prices can be explained by the present value model if people believe that dividend growth contains a unit root. Hansen et. al. (1993 Hansen et. al. ( , 1997 show that their linear-quadratic specification under habit formation and distorted beliefs matches the market price of risk.
We contrast our approach to the more common one that preserves full rationality but assumes increasingly complicated preference structures for resolving asset price puzzles. While Campbell and Cochrane (1999) are able to provide a fully rational unified explanation for the asset pricing anomalies mentioned above using a utility function that displays a sophisticated form of habit persistence, our formulation retains the simplicity of time-separable CRRA utility but allows for what we believe to be reasonable departures from full rationality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reports the stylized facts of the equity and bond market that we seek to explain. Section 3 presents the fully rational Lucas asset pricing model, which serves as a benchmark for results. In section 4, we endow the representative agent with a distorted belief system and discuss the solution and the computation of implied moments from the model. Section 5 reports on the model's solution to the many empirical puzzles. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
Stylized Facts of Asset Returns
1 Table 1 presents the list of anomalies around which our investigation is organized.
In addition to understanding the mean-value of returns, we are concerned with four additional features of the data. The first of these is the volatility of the equity premium and the risk-free rate, and the correlation between these returns. Second, we seek to explain why excess equity returns are negatively serially correlated at long horizons which accounts for the observed mean-reverting behavior of stock prices. In 1 The data on equity and short-term bond returns is the updated version of Campbell and Shiller (1988) . The equity data are the Standard and Poors 500 Price Index and Dividends. The nominally risk free rate is the return from 6 month commercial paper bought in January and rolled over in July. Using the Producer Price Index, we measure expected inflation as the fitted value from a regression of inflation on two lags each of inflation, the nominally risk free rate, and nominal equity returns. The real risk free rate is then constructed by subtracting expected inflation from the nominally risk free rate.
the table, we characterize the correlogram for excess equity returns by computing the k-period variance ratio. These values are generally less than 1, indicating non-zero 2 variance of transitory components in asset prices. Third, we investigate the ability of the model to explain findings by researchers such as Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988) , who report that the log dividend yield predicts longhorizon excess returns. Here, we represent the predictability puzzle by regressions of the k-period excess return on the log dividend-price ratio. As can be seen from the table, the predictive regressions run on our data display the familiar pattern of slope coefficients and R 's that increase with the return horizon. Fourth, we confront the model with the procyclicality of the equity premium as measured by annualized excess returns for holding periods beginning and ending in expansions, beginning and ending in contractions and alternatively, for holding periods that simply end during expansions and those that end during contractions.
The Rational Economy
Since our main purpose is to examine the implications of departures from rationality, it is useful to provide a benchmark for our investigation by summarizing the properties of the fully rational model. We begin with a variant of Lucas's (1978) representative agent endowment economy that has served as the workhorse in aggregate asset pricing studies. Let P be the price of the equity, which is a claim to the future stream of the nonstorable endowment, which we call dividends, D. One perfectly divisible share of the equity trades in a competitive market. The first-order condition that must hold if the agent behaves optimally is,
where primes denote next period values, M is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, and E(·|I) is the representative individual's subjective expectation con-2 The variance ratio statistic, popularized by Cochrane (1988) , is the variance of the k−year return divided by k times the variance of the one-year return.
3 For analyses of the second moments, see Constantinides (1990) and Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1993) . Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) study the theory's implications for mean-reverting equity returns. 
(2) C Define ω ≡ P/C as the price-consumption ratio and c ≡ ln(C). Dividing eq.(2) by C yields the stochastic difference equation in ω,
where ∆ is the first difference operator.
The Endowment Process
We follow Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990, 1993) by assuming that ∆c evolves according to the following version of Hamilton's (1989) Markov switching process,
where ε ∼ N (0, σ ) and S is an underlying two-point Markov state variable that assumes values of 0 or 1. We normalize S = 1 to be the good (expansion) state of high consumption growth and S = 0 to be the bad (contraction) state of low consumption growth, so that α(1) > α(0). S evolves according to the transition probabilities,
Here, p is the probability of remaining in an expansion if currently in one and 1 − p is the probability of a transition from an expansionary state to a contraction. Similarly, q is the probability of remaining in a contraction if currently in a contraction while 1 − q is the probability of moving from a contraction to a expansion. Two features of the 'truth' are worth noting. The first is that expansions are highly persistent. Given that the economy is in an expansion state, the probability that the expansion will terminate is less than 0.03. Moreover, the economy spends most of the time in the expansionary state with the unconditional probability of being in that state being Pr(S = 1) 
Solution and Properties of the Rational Economy
In the benchmark model, the subjective expectations of individuals E(·) coincide with the mathematical expectations E(·) taken with respect to the truth. This particular complete markets rational economy is closely related to the environment studied by Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1993) , Kandel and Stambaugh (1990) , and Mehra and Prescott (1985) .
Due to the independence of the shock ε, we can write the stochastic difference equation for the price-consumption ratio ω in eq.(3) in terms of the single state variable S,
Because S can take on only the values 0 or 1, eq. (6) is a system of two linear equations in ω(0) and ω(1),
where β(S) ≡ βe , S = 0, 1. Solving eq. (7) yieldŝˆˆq
The next step is to characterize the solution for one period returns. Gross equity e returns, R , are given by
Since the price of a one-period risk-free asset P is the expected intertemporal marginal rate of substitution,
f the implied gross risk-free rate R is
It is now well known that asset returns data can be explained using the standard 6 model by choosing either large values of γ (e.g., 57) or β > 1. The challenge then, as articulated by Mehra-Prescott (1985) and Kocherlakota (1996) , is to produce a model that explains the data with values of β between 0 and 1, and positive values of γ below 10. To establish the model's benchmark performance, we restrict our attention to values of γ less than ten, and associated values of β less than one that predict a mean risk-free rate of 2.5 percent, subject to satisfying the transversality 7 condition of the model. Table 3 displays the implied behavior of asset prices when the 5 The information structure here corresponds to Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1993) and Abel (1994) , in that the information set upon which asset prices are based includes S and , for i = 0, 1, 2, .....
t−i t −i
6 See Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) , Kocherlakota (1990) , and Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1993) . 7 The transversality condition requires that the power series for the price level implied by the difference equation (2) yield finite values. Practically, this requirement can be checked by verifying representative agent is fully rational for selected values of the preference parameters.
As is well known, this model fails on many dimensions: there is virtually no equity premium, the volatility of equity returns is far below its sample value, and excess returns have neither the persistence nor the predictability found in the data.
A Distorted Beliefs Economy
Referring back to eq.(1), the two main ingredients in our attempt to explain the behavior of P given the behavior of C are first, a model of preferences (M), and second, a model of beliefs (E).
In considering departures from the basic model, one line of asset pricing research has been aimed at retaining rational expectations, but enriching the model of preferences. For example, Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) , Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) , and Weil (1989) examine recursive nonexpected utility, while Constantinides (1990) , Heaton (1995) and Abel (1990) study versions of habit persistence. Recently, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) report success in accounting for many of the same features of the data that we consider by retaining rational expectations but complicating preferences in a way to display a particular form of habit persistence.
Our line of attack is the dual to Campbell and Cochrane. The returns behavior they achieve by varying M for fixed E can also be obtained for a given M with the appropriate specification of E-that is, by distorting beliefs. The interesting question then, is what sorts of departures from rationality are necessary, and how large do the 8 departures need to be?
that implied values for ω(S) are always positive.
8 In a linear-quadratic environment, Hansen et. al. (1993 Hansen et. al. ( , 1997 ) demonstrate that their model under rational expectations and recursive non-expected utility combined with habit persistence was equivalent to a model with expected utility in conjunction with a particular form of distorted beliefs. Hansen et. al. interpret these distortions as Knightian uncertainty (the situation where information is too imprecise to be summarized by probabilities) as studied by Epstein and Wang (1994) . They demonstrate that their model is equivalent to a consumer with standard quadratic expected utility facing a malevolent opponent whose purpose is to minimize the welfare of the consumer by distorting the dynamics of the economy. From that perspective, they also interpret the distortions as encoding the sophisticated attempts of the consumer to accommodate specification errors. These attempts takes into account 'the worst case scenarios', as in the Maxmin theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , in the sense that the hypothetical malevolent opponent is 'minimizing' the welfare of the In sections 4.1, 4.1.1 and 4.2 we introduce our model with distorted beliefs, and characterize the solution for asset returns. Section 5 follows with empirical results.
Modelling Distorted Beliefs
Because the expected endowment growth rate, E(∆c ) = E[α(S)], depends on the state transition probabilities, variations in the subjective transition probabilities alone will induce changes in subjective endowment growth. In order to clarify the effects of misperceived state persistence and misperceptions of endowment growth, we model both of these aspects of beliefs. We define the subjective belief parameters to be non negative and denote them with a 'tilde'.
Agents observe the true state of the economy and when the endowment is in the expansionary state, their beliefs are governed by,p
e e e e e where S is an independent two-point Markov state variable that assumes values 1 or e −1 with the symmetric transition probabilities, When the economy is in the contractionary state, agents beliefs are governed by, 
Discussion
Full rationality imposes considerable discipline on a researcher while modelling departures from unbounded rationality is largely uncharted territory in aggregate asset pricing research. A large part of the difficulty lies in the lack of guidance generally available and the absence of an accepted methodology. The first component of the distortion in our model of subjective beliefs is systematic. A plausible explanation for systematic distortions of this type is that individuals find it too costly to acquire the skills to do maximum-likelihood estimation or to perform integration with respect to multivariate densities when making decisions about every day life. Instead, they respond by using rules of thumb that give approximately the right answer. We use the following simple rules of thumb calculations to guide our modelling of the systematic distortion in the subjective transition probabilities.
Suppose that the agent realizes that consumption growth is governed by a twostate Markov process, she just doesn't know the transition probabilities. A sensible person might pursue the following strategy for 'estimating' p and q. First, obtain 9 a copy of the NBER reference cycle chronology. Second, convert the chronology to an annual frequency. From these data, estimate q by the proportion of years in which contractions are followed by contractions, the unconditional probability of Table 2 . These simple calculations suggest that we should concentrate on subjective beliefs that exhibit excessive pessimism about expansion states and excessive optimism about contraction states -p < p andq < q.
The second dimension in which beliefs are distorted involves randomization of the subjective transition probabilities about their subjective means. We interpret the state variables associated with the subjective distortions, S and S , as pseudo-signals, e c 11 as suggested by Black (1986) .
9 This information is available on the NBER's home page at http://www.nber.org 10 A second, and equally simple method, uses per-capita consumption growth data and yields similar results. Begin by assigning all years in which per-capita consumption contracted to the bad state and the remainder, those with positive per-capita consumption growth, to the good state. Then use the same simple technique based on the persistence of contractions and the unconditional probability of expansions to estimate the transition probabilities. The result is an estimate for p equal to 0.760 and an estimate for q equal to 0.269.
11 Abel (1997) models a related set of distortions. The systematic distortion in p and q loosely corresponds to 'pessimism' in Abel's model, which describes the situation when subjective distributions are first-order dominated by the objective distribution. Randomization in p and q corresponds to 'doubt' in Abel's model which is said to occur when the subjective distribution is a mean-preserving spread over the objective distribution.
It bears emphasizing that only subjective beliefs may be distorted, not the actual endowment-which evolves according to the truth. This is a subtle but important point that distinguishes our approach from Reitz's (1988) in which the actual endowment evolved according to a distorted process. The agents know whether the economy is presently in the expansionary state or in the contractionary state and they condition their expectations on this information.
It is possible to give a 'peso problem' interpretation to our model by viewing the agents as rational, while it is the econometrician who errs in believing that endowment growth follows the two-state Markov process of eqs. (4) and (5). Under this interpretation the true data generating process for the endowment conforms to the probability model of eqs. (13) through (20) but the econometrician is led to the wrong model by attempting estimation and inference on a sample of insufficient size. Because of our limited historical experience with consumption growth, realizations in regions of the sample space necessary to identify and to estimate the true model are absent. These problems of limited experience and associated difficulties in drawing inference from small samples form the foundation of both interpretations and whether the error is attributed to the economic agents (distorted beliefs) or to the econometrician (peso problem) is a philosophical issue that cannot be resolved here. We simply note here 12 that some readers may be more comfortable with this alternative interpretation.
Solving the Distorted Beliefs ModelT
here are now 8 possible outcomes for the distorted beliefs state vector, S ≡ (S, S , S ). As was the case in the rational model, the solution centers on solving for c e the price-consumption ratio. We begin by writing the equilibrium price-consumption ratio as function of the state vector, ω(S). The resulting stochastic difference equation, the analog to equation (6) is,
12 In the original peso-problem, the agent rationally attaches a nonzero probability to the event in which the monetary authorities would devalue the currency, even though the monetary history contained no such devaluations. Evans (1998) recently investigated peso-problem implications for stock returns. L et P be the subjective transition matrix whose ij-th element (i, j = 1, . . . , 8.) is ˜¯¯¯¯˜P = Pr[S = S |S = S ], (A full description of P and S is given in the appendix).
Then eq.(22) can be written as,
Rewriting in vector notation, we have
where I is an 8-dimensional identity matrix, ω = ω(S ),
= βe P , and f = βe P e ,
for i, j = 1, . . . , 8. Using these results, we can now write the implied one-period gross equity return as ω (S ) + 1
) ω(S)T
he price of the one-period risk-free bond in state S is,
i i j j=1 f f p ¯¯¯t he associated gross risk-free rate of return is R (S) = 1/P (S), and R (S , S) = e f¯R (S , S)− R (S) is the excess return on equity. The moments of the equity premium and the risk-free rate are then computed with respect to the objective probabilitȳ distribution of S.
Properties of the Distorted Beliefs Model
To assess the value-added from each aspect of the model we proceed in steps. First, we investigate the role of systematic distortions in subjective transition probabilities by fixingp andq at values that deviate from p and q. Next, we randomize beliefs by allowing the subjective transition probabilitiesp andq to evolve as i.i.d. processes.
Third, we introduce persistence in the stochastic subjective transition probabilities.
Throughout these first three experiments, conditional subjective endowment growth is non-stochastic and is undistorted. In a fourth experiment, we allow for both randomized subjective transition probabilities and randomized subjective endowment growth.
Systematic Distortions in Subjective Transition Probabilities
In this section, we study the extent to which fixed but distorted perceptions of the persistence parameters explain the asset pricing puzzles set forth in section 2b y setting δ = δ =τ =τ = 0 and where beliefs over (p,q) are the fixed values Table 4 reports parameter values that solve the equity premium puzzle. These are combinations of (p,q, β, γ) for which the mean equity premium and mean riskfree rate predicted by the model are 5.5 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively. The region of the parameter space that accomplishes this feat quite large as it includes values ofp that range from 0.5 to 0.8 and values ofq varying from 0.1 to 0.9. Notice that relatively mild degrees of relative risk aversion are required to match the first moments of returns.
The belief distortions presented in the table can be divided into two categories.
The first are those in which a moderately risk-averse agent displays pessimism about expansion persistence (p < p), but displays optimism about contraction persistence (q < q). For example, when (p,q) = (0.7, 0.2), roughly our rule-of-thumb values, (β, γ) = (0.91, 5.8) solves the equity premium puzzle. The second category of distorted beliefs that solve the equity premium puzzle are those in which nearly risk-neutral individuals are uniformly pessimistic. Here, the agent believes that expansions are less persistent (p < p) and contractions more persistent (q > q) than they truly are.
For example, (p,q) = (0.6, 0.9) requires (β, γ) = (0.97, 0.41) to match mean returns.
The job of matching the first moments of the equity premium and the risk-free rate is accomplished primarily by judicious choice of two parameters -p and γ. Lowering f p strengthens the precautionary saving motive and hence lowers R so increasing expansion state pessimism lowers the risk-free rate. Thus for given values of β, γ, and q, we can choosep to match the mean risk-free rate. As compensation for covariance risk, equilibrium equity returns increase in agent's relative risk aversion, γ, but under CRRA utility function, increasing γ also reduces the agent's willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally with the result that higher values of γ raise the average f risk-free rate. In the fully rational model, this causes R to be too high and creates the risk-free rate puzzle. But here, we can reducep to balance the impact of higher γ, and match the first moments.
We now turn our attention to the last 3 columns of Table 4 , which display the implied volatility of the equity premium and the risk-free rate and the correlation between them. While the model can account for the fact that the equity premium is substantially more volatile than the risk-free rate ( Table 1 shows the ratio of standard deviations to be around 3.7), the levels are much too low. The data show asset return volatility that is between two and four times what we can produce using the fixed beliefs model. Evidently, to match the volatilities and correlation, we need to 13 introduce time-variation in distorted beliefs.
Stochastically Independent Beliefs of State Persistence
We now endow agents with randomized, but stochastically independent beliefs of˜r egime persistence. By setting φ = φ = 0.5 along with nonzero values of δ and c e p δ , the subjective transition probabilitiesp andq evolve as i.i.d. processes. We leave q subjective growth rates undistorted atα = α(1) = 2.25, andα = α(0) = −6.79.
e c 13 The literature suggests that introducing leverage might help the fixed distorted beliefs model to match the volatility in returns. In Benninga and Protopapadakis (1990) the standard model is shown to match the first two moments of asset returns with relative risk aversion coefficient near 10 and a debt-to-market-value ratio of 0.6 but they also require negative time discounting. Abel (1999) combines a similar degree of leverage with a 'catching up with the Joneses' preference structure and matches the volatility of asset returns with positive time preference. We have examined the impact of leverage of the magnitude found in the actual data, and find that with CRRA utility it does increase volatility, but not by enough to match the data. Furthermore, we suspect that a simple model with leverage would be incapable of matching the persistence and predictability of asset returns. While introducing leverage is an interesting extension, it would get us off our main focus of looking at the type and magnitude of belief distortions necessary to explain asset returns, and so we do not pursue it further. Table 5 reports the mean and volatility of the equity premium and the risk-free rate and correlation between these returns predicted by the i.i.d. subjective transition probability model. A nontrivial region of the admissible parameter space allows the model to match mean returns and the volatility of the risk free rate, in addition to producing a small negative correlation between the equity premium and risk-free asset return. But as is clear from the column labeled "σ ", i.i.d. variations inp andq do eq not raise the implied volatility of the equity premium by a sufficient magnitude, as it is still one-half to one-third the level of the standard deviation in the sample.
To investigate why the model with i.i.d. randomization of subjective persistence fails to match the second moments, in Table 6 we report the behavior of the priceconsumption ratio and mean asset returns during an expansion whenp fluctuates between high and low values while holdingq fixed. As is evident from the last column, the changes in the expected equity premium induced by movements inp fall far short of the 19 percent standard deviation of the equity premium measured in the data.
The price-consumption ratio ω is increasing in expansion state pessimism but since a switch to pessimism is known to be transitory, individuals subsequently expect the price-consumption ratio to revert to its mean which implies a future capital loss. Thus, low expected equity returns are associated with episodes of expansion state pessimism.
At the same time, precautionary saving increase so that pessimistic episodes are also associated with a low risk free rate. The upshot is that randomized and serially independentp generate substantial volatility in gross returns but not in excess returns.
While this analysis focused upon fluctuations inp for fixedq, we find (but do not report) essentially the same behavior in the log consumption-price ratio and mean asset returns during contractions whenq switches between high and low values with fixedp.
Persistently Evolving Beliefs of State PersistencẽW
e now relax the restriction that φ = φ = 0.5 to allow for persistence in the c e subjective state transition probabilities. We continue to assume that the shocks arẽẽ qually persistent (φ = φ ) and that subjective endowment growth is undistorted , φ , and φ that match the mean and volatility of the risk-free rate and equity q e c premium. To narrow the scope of the search, we limited our evaluation to values ofμ = 0.71 andμ = 0.24 which are in the neighborhood of our rule of thumb pq calculations. Table 7 reports three cases in which the model is able to match all five sample statistics with values of the discount factor less than 1 and risk-aversion coefficient less than 10. In the first line of the table, the representative agent discounts the future at a rate of 17 percent and has a relative risk aversion coefficient of 9.89.
The subjective probability that an expansion will continue given that the economy is currently in an expansion fluctuates between 0.73 and 0.69 while the subjective probability about the persistence of the next contraction fluctuates between 0.06 and 0.42. Individuals display pessimism over the expansion since even the high value ofp lies below p. Similarly, since the high value ofq lies below q, agents display optimism about contractions. The agent's subjective belief about the persistence of the states are themselves are persistent. Once the agent adopts a view, the probability that these views will change is 1 − φ = 0.09. Why do serially correlated subjective transition probabilities generate sufficiently volatile excess returns, without an attendant increase in the volatility of risk-free returns? The key lies in seeing that the risk-free rate depends only on what happens between the current period and the next. Since the economy is normally in an expansionary state, changes inq reflect changes in beliefs about a state of the world that the economy experiences only infrequently. Changes inq will therefore affect the risk-free rate only on those rare occasions when the economy is actually in the bad state. Returns on the long-term asset, equity, the other hand, depend on expectations of events over the infinite future. Given that the economy is currently in the expansionary state, persistent changes inq affect equity returns through expected marginal utility in the distant as well as in the immediate future.
The same mechanism that causes fluctuations in equity returns while leaving the risk-free rate unchanged following a switch inq during an expansion is at play during a contraction in which a switch inp causes equity returns fluctuate while leaving the risk free rate unaffected. Because the economy is only rarely in the contractionary state, changes inp are relatively unimportant in determining the volatility of the excess returns. Indeed, the results in Table 7 are virtually unaffected when we fixφ = 0.5 instead of allowing it to switch along with φ .
e c
Serial Correlation and Predictability of Returns
In this section, we study the explanatory power of the model with persistently changing subjective beliefs of persistence to explain the two stylized facts about persistence and predictability reported in Table 1 : i) variance ratio statistics that decline from above 1.0 at a two year horizon to 0.8 at an eight year horizon, implying mean 2 reversion in equity prices; and ii) the slope coefficients and R 's of regressions of longhorizon excess returns on the current log consumption-price ratio that increase with horizon, implying improved predictability at longer horizons.
We present results for three cases, labelled I, II and III, with parameter configurations reported at the top of the table (and identical to those in Table 7 ). Since the dynamics of the consumption-price ratio process ω, which is the model's analog to the dividend-price ratio, is key to understanding the evolution of equity returns, we begin by presenting selected implied moments of ω in panel A of Table 8 The simulated data match the sample values nearly exactly. The performance of the model follows directly from the mean reversion of the consumption-price ratio and excess returns inherit their stochastic properties from ω. When such a process is away from its mean, the predicted deviation from its current level is increasing in the horizon. It is in this manner that a mean-reverting consumption-price ratio implies both predicted returns and predictability that increase with the horizon. Again, thẽẽ conomy with φ = 0.91 provides the closest match to the data. When φ is exceeds 0.91, the mean reversion in the consumption-price ratio is too slow to generate the short-horizon predictability observed in the data.
The results for the variance ratio statistics are nearly identical to that for the regressions which is not surprising since both are functions of the same underlying autocorrelations of the consumption-price ratio.
Pro-cyclical Equity Premium
To compare the predictions of the model to the cyclical pattern of the equity premium in the data, we evaluated the mean equity premium under various states of the endowment growth under parameter values from the configuration labeled case I in Table 8 . While not a perfect match, the model generates a coarse correspondence between the predicted cyclical patterns of the equity premium and that seen in the data. The model predicts that the mean equity premium during transitions from expansion to expansion is 6.18 percent while the sample counterpart is 10.54 percent.
The predicted equity premium during transitions from contraction to contraction is -10.52 percent, while the average value in the data is -14.63 percent. The predicted mean equity premium over periods ending in expansion is 6.10 percent, while the sample counterpart is 13.66 percent. Finally, the predicted mean equity premium over periods ending in contraction is -7.34 percent with sample counterpart -11.24 15 percent. The procyclicality of the equity premium emerges because high endowment growth during expansions works to raise the return on equity whereas the systematic distortions of expansion pessimism and contraction optimism contribute to a countercyclical risk-free rate.
Distorted Subjective Endowment Growth
Finally, we examine the role of distortions in subjective endowment growth. Tõĩ less. The reason is that switches in subjective growth induce correlated movements in equity returns and in the risk-free rate. A switch in subjective contractionary state growth causes fluctuations in both asset returns during an expansion while switches in subjective expansionary state growth cause fluctuations in both returns during contractions. Subjective growth rates need to be highly persistent in order to generate sufficiently high volatility in the equity premium, but at the same time, these beliefs are associated with log consumption price ratios that are so persistent that they fail to predict future excess returns.
Conclusion
We have shown that a simple aggregate asset pricing model in which agents have distorted beliefs can replicate a number of features of observed asset returns data.
We are able to match the means, standard deviations and correlation of the equity premium and the risk-free rate, as well as the persistence and predictability of longhorizon excess equity returns. In addition, the predicted cyclical patterns of the equity premium corresponds roughly to patterns observed in the data. Our investigation finds that beliefs must be distorted in two ways. First, agents must believe that both expansions and contractions will be less persistent than implied by careful econometric analyses of the data. Second, agents' views of these transition probabilities must exhibit stochastic and persistent variation.
The model can be criticized for the inability or unwillingness of agents to learn over time. We suspect, however, that if agents were Bayesian learners, convergence would occur reasonably fast and that over the time-span of our data set, they would have learned by now to be rational. Under CRRA utility, this provides little help in understanding asset returns. On the other hand, if the true process is stationary, with the passage of sufficient time, the rule-of-thumb estimation of the mean transition probabilities should converge to the truth. Exactly how much time is required for convergence to occur is another issue. It is entirely likely that slow learning describes the real world environment and that the 104 years of data is still too short to overcome this small sample problem.
Nevertheless, the model is successful in characterizing asset returns data, which is accomplished within the framework of a representative agent endowment economy, with CRRA preferences, and a two-state Markov process governing per-capita consumption growth. The simplicity of our approach provides an attractive alternative to the strategy of introducing either increasingly complex preference specifications, heterogeneity, or market incompleteness, to address the failures of the standard model. 
